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  Abstract 
We report results from experimental first-price, sealed-bid, all-pay auctions for a good with 
a common and known value. We observe bidding strategies in groups of two and three 
bidders and under two extreme information conditions. As predicted by the Nash 
equilibrium, subjects use mixed strategies. In contrast to the prediction under standard 
assumptions bids are drawn from a bimodal distribution: very high and very low bids are 
much more frequent than intermediate bids. Standard risk preferences cannot account for 
our results. However, bidding behavior is consistent with the predictions of a model with 
reference dependent preferences as proposed by the prospect theory. 
Keywords 
All-pay Auction; Prospect Theory, Experiment 
JEL Classification 
D44, D72, D80, C91. 
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1.  Introduction 
Bidding behavior in all-pay auctions has so far only received limited attention in empirical auction 
research. This might be due to the fact that most of the applications of auction theory do not involve 
the all-pay rule. However, occurrences of this auction format, where every bidder pays her bid are 
numerous: lobbying battles, political campaigns, promotion tournaments in firms and applications for 
science grants (Klemperer, 2004).  
In this article we report experimental data on bidding behavior from the simplest possible all-pay 
auction  format.  We  conducted  first-price,  sealed-bid,  common  value  auctions  with  two  or  three 
bidders and no uncertainty with regard to the value of the auctioned commodity. Every subject bids in 
an auction for a prize of 100 monetary units. Subjects choose their bids simultaneously, the highest 
bidder receives the prize, and all bidders pay their bid. We analyze bidding behavior in ten subsequent 
auctions and under two different information conditions. In the NoRecall treatment subjects do not 
receive any information about other subjects’ bids during the ten rounds. In the Recall treatment 
subjects have full information about the bidding history in their group. 
Previous evidence on bidding behavior in experimental all-pay auctions comes from Gneezy and 
Smorodinsky (2006), who conducted similar all-pay auctions with group sizes of four to 12. They 
report persistent overbidding, i.e., average bids were considerably higher than predicted by the Nash 
equilibrium for all group sizes.
1 While the existing literature focuses on aggregate outcomes, our aim 
is to investigate individual bidding strategies. Thus we study bidding behavior in the simplest case of 
auctions and in small groups. 
We find that subjects indeed use mixed strategies, however, the observed distribution of bids 
shows interesting deviations from the predictions under standard assumptions. The mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium under standard assumptions predicts uniformly distributed bids for groups of two 
players  and  a  decreasing  density  function  for  larger  group  sizes.  We  find  that  subjects’  bidding 
strategies differ sharply from these predictions: on average, subjects apply bimodal bidding strategies 
which give most weight to both very low and very high bids, resulting in a bimodal bidding function. 
Bimodal  bidding occurs for  both group sizes and information conditions. We show that  bimodal 
bidding is consistent with prospect theory. If players are risk seeking in the domain of losses and risk 
averse in the domain of gains then equilibrium bidding strategies are bimodal. 
 
 
                                                 
1 A related strand of literature focuses on the rent-seeking game introduced by Tullock (1967), where higher 
bids increase the bidder's share of the pie (or rent). See Millner and Pratt (1991), Shogren and Baik (1991), and 
Davis and Reilly (1998), Öncüler and Croson (2005) or Herrmann and Orzen (2008).    3 
2.  Theory and Experimental Design  
The  game  is  played  in  groups  of  n=2  or  3  bidders.  All  players  simultaneously  choose  their  bid 
i b + ∈ℝ . The auctioned commodity has a value of unity for all bidders. A player’s expected utility 
:
N





if   for all 





b b b b j i
M b u b b
b
−
 − = ≥ ≠  = 
− 
.  (1) 
max ( ) M b   counts  the  number  of  maximal  bidders.  Following,  we  intuitively  derive  the  Nash 
equilibria of this game. A thorough theoretical treatment of this game is provided by Baye et al. 
(1996). Clearly the game cannot have an equilibrium in pure strategies since the best reply to every 
bid in [0,1) is to overbid by the smallest amount possible. In every mixed strategy equilibrium it must 
hold that bidders are indifferent between the mixed strategy and any pure strategy included in their 
mixed strategy. As long as the support of the mixed strategy includes zero, the expected utility in the 
mixed strategy must be zero. For n=2 this game has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies where 
both players draw their bid from a uniform distribution over the support [0,1]. The expected utility 
then equals zero for both players.  
Could the two players improve their situation by restraining the support of their mixed strategy 
from above, i.e., both drawing their bid from  [0, ] b  with  1 b < ? No, because this would offer the 
opportunity of earning a strictly positive utility by outbidding the other player with a pure strategy of 
bidding slightly more than b . Could they improve by choosing their bid from [ ,1] b  with  0 b > ? This 
is also not possible as bidding b  would then result in a certain loss and the player would prefer to bid 
0. To conclude, both players choose their bid from a uniform distribution with support [0,1] and earn 
an expected payoff of zero. Expected bids are 0.5 and expected standard deviation is  1/12 0.289 = . 
Expected gross returns of the auctioneer are 1, which equals the value of the auctioned commodity. 
For n=3 the theoretical solution becomes more complicated. There exists a unique symmetric 
equilibrium where all players draw their bid from 
0.5 ( ) 0.5 , [0,1] i i i f b b b
− = ∈ . In addition, there is a 
continuum of equilibria of the following kind: two players randomize on [0,1] while the third player 
randomizes  continuously  on  an  interval  [ ,1] b   and  concentrates  the  remaining  mass  at  zero,  with 
0 1 b ≤ ≤ . The equilibria reach from  0 b = , which is the symmetric case to  1 b = , in which player 
three does not take part in the auction and the other two players choose their bids according to the 
equilibrium strategy in the two player case. Expected bids for the two players who randomize with 
full support range from one third to one half, expected bids from the third bidder range from zero to 
one third. All equilibria share the following features: the expected bids are one third, expected utility   4 
of all bidders is zero and the revenue for the auctioneer is unity. Standard deviations of the bids 
depend on the equilibrium and range from 0.298 for  0 b =  to 0.333 for  1 b = . 
All equilibria also have in common that they are not lucrative for the bidders. It is straightforward 
to show that collusion can substantially increase the expected utility of the bidders. For example, if 
n=2 and both bidders bid zero, their expected utility is 0.5.
2 However, incentives to deviate from this 
collusive strategy are obviously very strong. 
Our  experimental  subjects  were  first  year  students  from  the  University  of  St.  Gallen.  The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the 
beginning of the experiment subjects were given a show-up fee of CHF 20 (about $18). Losses in the 
experiment were deducted from the show-up fee. The auctioned item was 100 ECU (Experimental 
Currency Unit). We conducted two treatments, the Recall and the NoRecall treatment.  
In the Recall treatment subjects were allocated to groups of two or three subjects and played ten 
consecutive but independent all-pay auctions in unchanged groups. Full information about bids of 
group members in all previous rounds was provided. 
In the NoRecall treatment subjects also played ten consecutive all-pay auctions for a price of 100 
ECU. In each round they were randomly allocated to groups of either two or three subjects. They were 
informed about their group size but received no information at all about the outcome of the auction 
and the other subjects’ bids. Prior to the experiment subjects were given detailed instructions (see 
Appendix). Bids were restricted in the interval [0,125] and a resolution up to three decimal places.
3 
We report results from 52 subjects in two experimental sessions. We apply a within subject design 
where all subjects played both treatments, changing the order of the treatments between sessions. The 
experiment lasted about an hour and the subjects earned on average CHF 19.4 (about $17.5), which 
means that, on average, subjects made a small loss of CHF .6 in the 20 auctions they played. 
 
 
3.  Results 
We start by analyzing the data from the Recall treatment. In this treatment subjects had access to the 
whole history of bids within their group and played the game in stable groups. These are arguably the 
conditions most favorable for the establishment of a mixed strategy equilibrium.
4  
                                                 
2 In our experiment the tie rule was that all maximum bidders pay their bid and one randomly chosen bidder 
receives the price. 
3 The upper bound of 125 was introduced to prevent subjects from making large losses due to erroneous entries. 
However, this upper bound was not communicated to the subjects in the instructions to prevent anchoring.  
4 Once a bidder learns that other bidders use a pure bidding strategy she can simply outbid the others by the 
smallest amount and earn a secure payoff, while the others make a loss.   5 
Average  bids  over  the  ten  rounds  were  42.0  in  groups  of  two  and  36.9  in  groups  of  three. 
Compared to the Nash prediction of 50 and 33.3 respectively, we observe underbidding in groups of 
two  and  overbidding  in  groups  of  three.  The  differences  are,  however,  not  significant.
5  The 
underbidding in groups of two might partially be due to attempts of collusion. If both players bid zero 
and let chance decide about the winner, they have an expected profit of 50. The results by Huck et al. 
(2004) suggest that collusive strategies are most likely to be observed in small groups. Average bids 
are, however, not too informative with regard to the bidding strategies subjects played. If we calculate 
the standard deviation of the bids, we observe 40.0 in groups of two which is higher than predicted by 
the Nash equilibrium (28.9). In groups of three the observed standard deviation was 39.8 compared to 
the prediction which lies between 29.8 and 33.3.
6 
However, the most striking differences to the Nash prediction emerge if we take a closer look at 
the  distribution  of  bids.  Figure  1  shows  histograms  of  the  bids  separated  by  group  size.  The 
distribution of bids is clearly bimodal. Very low and very high bids (up to 100) are much more 
frequent than intermediate bids. 
 
                                                 
5 A conservative test based on the independent group averages does not allow to reject the null hypothesis that 
average bids are equal to the Nash prediction (p=.140 for groups of two and p=.262 for groups of three, two-
sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test). 
6 In groups of two the difference is significant at p=.036, in groups of three insignificant with p=.263 (two-sided 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test).   6 






















































































































































































































In the groups of three subjects very low bids are more frequent than very high bids. However, the 
overall adjustment of the bids to the larger group size is much smaller than predicted. In order to 
compare the observed bid to predicted bids we plot the cumulative distribution of bids. Figure 2 
shows  the  cumulative  distribution  of  the  observed  bids  (bold  lines)  and  the  cumulative  densities 
predicted by the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (thin lines). In the right panel we account for the 
fact  that  multiple  equilibria  exist  and  depict  the  cumulative  densities  of  two  extreme  cases:  The 
kinked curve corresponds to the equilibrium where one player abstains from the auction (hence the 
intercept at one third) and the other two draw their bid from a uniform distribution; the smooth curve 
corresponds to the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.  
For the smaller group size, prediction and data are obviously very different. In the auctions with 
three  bidders  the  large  mass  at  very  low  bids  is  compatible  with  an  asymmetric  mixed  strategy 
equilibrium. Still, the mass of bids close to 100 is clearly not compatible with the prediction. If we 
apply  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  tests  for  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  bids  stem  from  the  predicted 
densities we can reject the null hypotheses for both group sizes and all equilibria at p < .001.
7 
                                                 
7 Simple Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests yield p values of virtually zero. However, we have to take into account that 
observations within a group are not independent. We do this by using each group’s Kolmogorov Smirnov test 
statistic as an observation. We then run a simulation (n = 1000) to calculate the test statistic for hypothetical bids 
drawn from the densities predicted by the symmetric Nash equilibria. In case of the asymmetric Nash equilibria 
we test the distribution of the non-zero bids against the predicted distribution most favorable to mass at very   7 
Figure 2  Nash Equilibrium (Thin Lines) and Observed Cumulative Distribution Functions of Bids 























































3.1. Individual Bidding Behavior 
The data presented thus far did not contain information as to what extent the subjects actually played 
mixed strategies. In a next step we will look at individual patterns. Figure 3 depicts small histograms 
for individual bidding behavior over the ten rounds of the Recall treatment, for both group sizes. Each 
vertical line corresponds to one subject in the experiment and shows the spread of the bids. Subjects 
are sorted according to average bid. The length of the small horizontal spikes corresponds to the 
frequency of the corresponding bid (bids are rounded to integers). The overwhelming majority of the 
subjects bid in the whole range from zero to (almost) 100. Three quarter of the subjects have a spread 
of 90 or more in their ten bids. The majority of the subjects changed their bid frequently during the 
ten rounds. If we calculate the number of different bids a subject chose, we obtain an average of 7.96 
different bids. More than a quarter of the subjects chose different bids in all ten rounds. Additionally 
we can look at the number of changes in a subject’s bid from one round to the next. In 90.4 percent of 




                                                                                                                                                        
high bids, which is the asymmetric equilibrium with one player abstaining from the auction. The test statistics 
for our data are always higher than for the simulated data. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test gives p < .001 in all cases. 
8 These numbers refer to all subjects in the Recall treatments, irrespective of group size.   8 
 
































Group size = 3
 
Note. Vertical lines show the spread of the bids of each individual, small horizontal lines depict the frequency of the 
corresponding bid (bids are rounded to integers).  
In order to test for time effects we ran OLS and Tobit estimates for the subjects’ bids. To take into 
account statistical dependence of observations within groups we estimate standard errors using the 
group as cluster. Table 1 reports the results of the OLS estimates (Tobit results are almost identical). 
Explanatory variables in Model (1) are the Round number, a dummy for the group size, a dummy for 
the order of the two treatments, Recall and NoRecall.
9 None of these variables explains the bidding 
behavior and the model as a whole is insignificant. This is surprising since the theoretically predicted 
expected bids differ considerably with group size (33.3 vs. 50). As shown above, subjects in groups of 
three overbid and subjects in groups of two underbid. Thus, in our data the influence of the group size 
on  bids  –  in  absolute  terms  –  is  much  smaller  than  predicted.  This  is  in  line  with  Gneezy  and 
Smorodinsky  (2006),  who  find  that  subjects’  bidding  behavior  does  not  sufficiently  react  to  the 
number of competitors at least in early rounds. They also report that bids decrease over time, reducing 
the amount of overbidding.
10  
                                                 
9 In our data we also have information about socio-economic characteristics of the participants, such as gender, 
age,  wealth  of  the  family  of  origin  and  urban  background.  In  all  estimates  these  controls  proved  to  be 
insignificant (alone and jointly). We did not include them in the estimates reported in Table 1. 
10 Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) discuss the logit equilibrium proposed by Anderson et al. (1998) concept as 
an explanation for the insufficient adjustment of bids to group size. In such an equilibrium players do not play   9 
In order to check whether there is pressure towards the equilibrium in our experiment we have to 
keep in mind that the direction is not clear. In groups of two, bids should increase, in groups of three 
they should decrease. We allow for different time trends in Model (2) with the interaction term. 
However, the model does not benefit from this at all. Finally, in Model (3) we add lagged variables. 
This  gives  us  a  model  with  some  explanatory  power.  A  subject’s  bid  in  the  previous  round  is 
positively related to her bid in the actual round. The maximal bid in the previous round has no effect. 
The most interesting result is the (weakly) significant coefficient for the dummy indicating whether 
the subject won the previous auction. Winners of the previous auction tend to reduce their bid in the 
actual round (controlled for the bid in the previous round). Choosing a high but losing bid seems to 
increase bids, while a win induces subjects to bid more conservatively in the next round. 
 
Table 1   OLS Estimates for Bids in the Recall and NoRecall Treatment 
   Dependent variable: Bid in t 
  Recall    NoRecall 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)     Model (4)  Model (5) 
Group size=3 (D)  -5.362  -7.258  2.552    -16.837***  -19.113** 
  (6.728)  (9.548)  (9.089)    (5.083)  (9.248) 
Round  0.048  -0.111  0.975    -0.706  0.027 
  (0.506)  (0.745)  (0.990)    (0.545)  (0.711) 
Round x Group size=3    0.345  -1.139      0.405 
    (0.998)  (1.065)      (1.154) 
Recall￿NoRecall (D)  4.570  4.570  1.911    -20.252**  -11.919** 
  (7.366)  (7.373)  (5.111)    (7.857)  (5.000) 
Bid in t-1      0.265**      0.438*** 
      (0.094)      (0.083) 
Maximum bid in t-1      0.030       
      (0.071)       
Won auction in t-1 (D)      -11.332*       
      (6.007)       
Constant  39.758***  40.633***  27.032**    72.034***  40.635*** 
  (5.537)  (6.629)  (9.804)    (5.260)  (7.207) 
F-test  0.3  0.2  2.6    6.9  24.0 
Prob > F  0.860  0.935  0.045    0.001  0.000 
R²  0.007  0.007  0.064    0.119  0.313 
N  520  520  468    520  468 
 
Notes. OLS estimates for bid in the Recall and in the NoRecall treatment. In parentheses we report robust standard errors 
using the group as cluster. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
                                                                                                                                                        
strict best response but play strategies with higher expected value with higher probability. In the extreme case 
(very large error term) strategies are drawn from the uniform distribution, thus trivially generating a positive 
relation  between  the  sum  of  bids  and  the  number  of  bidders.  Bimodal  distributions  of  bids  are,  however, 
incompatible with this solution concept. Our results suggest that deviations from Nash bidding behavior under 
standard assumptions is not driven by errors as formalized in the logit equilibrium.   10 
 
3.2. Reducing Information 
Thus far we have only analyzed data from the Recall treatments, where subjects learn other subjects’ 
bids and can adapt their bids accordingly in the next round. In the NoRecall treatments subjects 
receive no feedback at all from the game and cannot find out the success of their strategies. In such a 
game it is even more difficult to infer a subject’s bidding strategy from the observed bids. Even if 
subjects play a mixed strategy in the sense that they use a random draw from a probability distribution 
to determine their bid, it is unclear whether they draw every round or only once in the experiment. 
It was in fact the case that subjects changed their bids less frequently in the NoRecall treatment 
compared to the Recall treatment, despite the fact that in the NoRecall treatment group size changed 
over time. During the ten rounds, subjects chose on average 6.60 different bids (as opposed to 7.96 in 
the Recall treatment). Still, the overall distribution of bids was clearly bimodal for both groups of two 
and three subjects. Figure 4 shows histograms for the bids in the NoRecall treatments. 
 




















































































































































































































Group size = 3
 
Models (4) and (5) in Table 1 apply the estimation of Models (1) and (2) to the NoRecall data. 
Interestingly we observe effects of the group size and the order of the treatments. Bids are lower by 
16.8 units (standard error: 5.08) in groups of three compared to those of groups of two. The lack of 
adjustment of bids to group size observed in the Recall treatment (and also reported by Gneezy and 
Smorodinsky, 2006) disappears if we observe within subject variation of the group size. In fact, the   11 
size of the effect is very close to the predicted effect of 16.7 (=50–33.3). The dummy for the order of 
the two treatments is significant as well. When subjects have experienced the Recall treatment before 
playing the NoRecall treatment, bids are lower by 20.3 units (standard error: 7.86) compared to when 
they start with the NoRecall treatment. On the other hand, time effects remain insignificant. Model (5) 
presents the OLS estimate including the bid from the previous round as explanatory variable, which 
again has a significant positive influence. We do not add the other lagged variables to the equation 
because subjects in the NoRecall treatment had no information about the outcome of the auction 
during the ten rounds. 
Comparing the data from the NoRecall treatment to the Recall treatment also provides us with 
information about the subjects' attempts to collude. Collusive strategies can only be signaled by the 
subjects in the Recall treatment, because only there, the other bidder learns about the bids. In the 
groups with two subjects a bid of exactly zero was chosen in 5.4 percent of the cases in the Recall 
treatment but only in one percent of the cases in the NoRecall treatment. This difference is highly 
significant. For groups of three we find that the percentage of zero bids drops from 9.2 to 6.7 percent 
when we compare Recall and NoRecall, and the difference is not significant at all. We conclude from 
these  observations  that  some  of  the  bids  in  the  two  bidder  auctions  are  motivated  by  collusive 
attempts, however already in groups of three collusion is sufficiently difficult to achieve that it does 
not influence bidding behavior.
11 
 
4.  Why Bimodal Bidding? 
Why should one adopt a bimodal bidding strategy? Given that the subjects in our experiment did not 
play according to Nash strategies, a profit maximizing player would not be indifferent between all 
possible bids when playing against this population. We can use the observed distribution of bids to 
calculate the bid that maximizes expected profits, given the bimodal bidding behavior of the other 
subjects. The optimal bid lies somewhat above the lower mode of the bimodal bidding strategy in the 
region between 5 and 15. The worst thing to do is to bid slightly below the upper mode of the bidding 
strategy used by our subjects.  
There is already a great amount of empirical evidence which demonstrates that many people do 
not behave like expected profit maximizers in risky situations (see e.g. Dohmen et al., 2005). It is thus 
natural to explore the game theoretic predictions under different assumptions with regard to the utility 
function. The prime concern is risk preferences. The predictions derived in Section 2 hold only for 
players whose utility is linear in the monetary payoff of the game. Let us consider an arbitrary utility 
                                                 
11 We use probit estimates for bi=0 with the treatment dummy, round effects and the treatment order dummy as 
explanatory  variables.  The  treatment  dummy  is  highly  significant  for  groups  of  two  bidders (p = .003)  and 
insignificant for groups of three bidders (p = .340).   12 
function  ( ) i u x  where  i x  is the monetary payoff and  ' 0 u > . For every mixed strategy equilibrium 
with n homogeneous players it must hold that: 
  ( )
1 1 ( ) ( ) (1 ) 1 ( ) ( ) (0)
n n
i i i i i EU b F b u b F b u b u
− − = − + − − = .  (2) 
The expected utility of every bid bi used in the strategy equals the probability of winning the 
auction times the utility in case of a win, plus the probability of losing the auction times the respective 
utility. Both terms depend on F( ), which is the cumulative density of the bidding strategy of the other 
bidders. For a mixed strategy with full support to be a best reply this expression must be constant and 
equal to the utility of bidding zero. Following we assume  (0) 0 u =  without loss of generality. Thus 
the utility of winning the auction will be positive and losing the auction will yield zero or negative 
utility. From this expression we can easily derive the cumulative density of the equilibrium bidding 
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.  (3) 
What densities  ( ) i f b  can we generate with standard risk preferences? If we introduce different 
risk preferences into the utility function using a function with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion, we 
can only predict unimodal bidding strategies in groups of two players. Relative to the risk neutral 
case, risk aversion shifts mass towards low bids while risk seeking preferences shift mass towards 
high bids.
12 However, in light of the arguments by Rabin (2000) it is not very plausible that behavior 
in small stake games is explainable by the standard expected utility maximizing approach. Explaining 
behavior  which  deviates  from  expected  payoff  maximization  in  small  stake  situations  calls  for  a 
different explanation – an explanation that does not rely on a single concave or convex utility function 
in overall wealth.  
It  turns  out  that  the  bidding  strategies  observed  in  our  experiment  can  be  explained  by  the 
curvature of the utility function if we allow for concave and convex regions. This leads us to a very 
well known theoretical alternative to expected utility theory, namely Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory. A core element of prospect theory is that players evaluate their outcome relative to a 
reference  point.  If  they  earn  more  than  their  reference  point,  they  are  in  the  domain  of  gains, 
otherwise in the domain of losses. Kahneman and Tversky propose a ‘value function’ that is concave 
in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. In addition to that, Kahneman and Tversky 
introduce a ‘loss aversion’ parameter, which incorporates the notion that most people suffer more 
                                                 
12  For  example,  if  we  assume  a  utility  function  with  constant  relative  risk  aversion  (CRRA),  such  as  
u(x) = x
(1-γ)/(1-γ) we cannot produce a bimodal bidding function for groups of two bidders. For groups of three it 
is possible to generate bimodal bidding functions but it requires strong risk loving preferences.   13 
from  the  loss  of  a  certain  amount  of  money  than  they  enjoy  the  win  of  the  same  amount.  For 
illustration purposes we use the parametric specification proposed in Tversky and Kahneman (1992): 
 
if    0







 ≥  = 
− −  
.  (4) 
We denote the amount of money a player earns in an auction by x;  α  is a parameter for the 
curvature of the value function. Risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in losses requires 0 1 α < < . λ  
is a shifting parameter in the domain of losses, which is larger than one for loss aversion. We assume 
that in every auction the reference point is the actual wealth when entering the auction. Thus, winning 
the auction with a bid below 100 puts a player in the domain of gains while losing the auction with a 
positive bid puts a player in the domain of losses.
13 A second integral part of prospect theory is the 
probability weighting function which maps objective probabilities into subjective probabilities. For 
simplicity we do not consider the probability weighting function in our context because, unlike in the 
typical application of prospect theory, subjects in our game do not know the probability of winning 
and losing.
14 
Our experimental data offers an unusual approach to estimating preference parameters of prospect 
theory. Levy and Levy (2002) argue that empirical evidence on prospect theory focused largely on 
lotteries  involving  either  positive  or  negative  payoffs,  whereas  real  decisions  under  risk  usually 
involve positive and negative outcomes. They face their subjects with a set of mixed prospects and 
conclude form their data that behaviour is better explained by an reversed S-shaped value function 
rather than the S-shaped value function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky. Thus, unlike in prospect 
theory, Levy and Levy suggest a value function with  1 α > .
15 
We use a least squares method to fit a cumulative density for the bids to our data for both group 
sizes. We pool all data from the Recall and NoRecall treatments. The estimates for the preference 
                                                 
13  The  reference  point  is  usually  defined  as  the  status  quo.  Köszegi  and  Rabin  (2006)  discuss  the  role  of 
reference point determination and present a model where the reference point can differ from the status quo. In 
our context we think that an outcome of zero is a natural reference point.  
14 In our context the probability weighting function as usually assumed in cumulative prospect theory does not 
offer additional predictive power. If subjective probabilities deviate from objective probabilities, then equation 
(3) provides a condition for the subjective densities in equilibrium. In prospect theory it is usually assumed that 
changes in probabilities close to zero and one have more weight than changes in intermediate probabilities. 
Thus,  in  the  extreme  case  it  could  be  that  two  prospect  theory  agents  draw  their  bids  from  the  uniform 
distribution and perceive the winning probabilities as depicted by the bold line in the right panel of Figure 5, i.e., 
we could have an equilibrium where probability weighting offsets the effects of the prospect theory specific 
shape of the utility function. 
15 Baucells and Heukamp (2004) however show that the experimental results reported by Levy and Levy (2002) 
are in line with an s-shaped value function when probability weighting is taken into account.   14 
parameters are  .48 α = , and  .86 λ = .
16 The left panel in Figure 5 depicts the value function. The 
right panel depicts the fitted cumulative densities and the observed bids. Thus, unlike Levy and Levy 
our data is well organized by an S-shaped value function. A reverse S-shaped value function would 
predict a mode at intermediate bids, i.e., exactly the opposite of what we observe. 
 
Figure 5  Left Panel: Prospect Theory Value Function with Estimated Parameters. Right Panel: 
    Observed (Bold Lines) and Predicted (Thin Lines) Cumulative Densities for Both Group 


































Figure 5 shows that the combination of risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking 
behavior in the domain of losses as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) can account for 
bimodal  bidding  behavior.  Intuitively  the  subjects  use  a  make-or-break  strategy,  i.e.,  they  either 
submit a very low bid and hope for the lucky punch or they submit a very high bid in order to increase 
the winning probability. The potentially high loss connected with this strategy is acceptable due to the 
risk seeking preferences in the domain of losses. 
Surprisingly, the estimate for the loss aversion parameter λ  is smaller than one, which means the 
opposite of loss aversion, i.e., some sort of loss tolerance. This is at odds with many observations 
from  experiments  on  loss  aversion  in  risky  choice  situations  (see  e.g.  Gächter  et  al.,  2007  or 
Abdellaoui et al. 2007). We think that the main difference between this literature is that we observe 
risky choices in a strategic situation with competitive characteristics. We speculate that there is a 
                                                 
16 The literature provides a relatively wide range of parameter estimates. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) report 
α = .88 and λ = 2.25; Camerer and Ho (1994) find α = .32; Wu and Gonzalez (1996) find α = .50, the latter two do 
not include the loss aversion parameter. Booij et al. (2007) estimate the parameters in a representative sample 
allowing for different powers in gains and losses. They report no significant differences for the power in gains 
and losses and find α = .86 and λ = 1.58.   15 
preference for competing, which makes winning in an auction more attractive than earning the same 
amount of money in a simple lottery. Similar effects are also found in market entry games with a 
competitive structure (Fischbacher and Thöni, 2008). 
Prospect theory can account for bimodal bidding and for the fact that mass is shifted from the 
higher mode to the lower mode of the distribution when the number of contestants in the auction is 
increased. This corresponds to the observations in our experiment and also to the data reported by 
Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006). Furthermore, by allowing a λ  lower than one we can account for 
the fact that in larger groups bids are typically higher than predicted by the Nash equilibrium under 
standard assumptions.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
We  investigated  bidding  strategies  in  very  simple  common  value  all-pay  auctions  with  no  pure 
strategy equilibria. Bidders in our experiment use mixed strategies that are remarkably different from 
the mixed strategies predicted by the Nash equilibrium under standard assumptions. Bidders in our 
experiment drew their bids not from uniform or unimodal densities but from bimodal densities. They 
seemed to apply an all-or-nothing strategy, where they either chose a very low bid as a low risk 
strategy or a very high bid with high winning probabilities but large potential losses. Bimodal bidding 
strategies are observed under two very distinct information conditions: They occur when bidders are 
in stable groups with full information about the bidding history and also when bidders do not receive 
any information about other bidders' strategies.  
The bimodality in the distribution of bids cannot be explained by standard risk preferences but fits 
very well to the S-shaped value function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their prospect 
theory. We use our data to estimate preference parameters. For the curvature of the value function we 
find values that are comparable with the values reported in the literature. For the second ingredient of 
prospect theory's value function – loss aversion – we find strikingly different results. The observed 
bidding strategies are best explained when assuming the contrary of loss aversion. The reason for this 
is presumably not because our subjects like losses, but because the competitive structure of the game 
offers them additional utility when they win the auction. 
This hypothesized additional utility for winning an auction can additionally explain why bids tend 
to become excessive in larger groups, leading to systematic losses for the bidders in such all-pay 
auctions. Anderson et al. (1998) propose the logit equilibrium as a solution concept to account for 
excessive bids. In this framework players are boundedly rational in the sense that they make random 
errors  when  choosing  their  bid.  The  probability  of  choosing  a  strategy  that  is  not  best  reply  is 
negatively related to the expected payoff of that strategy. The distribution of bids we observe in our 
data makes this explanation highly unlikely, because a bimodal distribution of bids is not compatible 
with this kind of erroneous bids. Errors simply shift the densities predicted by the Nash equilibrium   16 
under standard assumptions towards the uniform distribution, but cannot produce a second mode at 
high bids. 
What  are  the  consequences  of  our  bidders  deviating  from  strategies  derived  under  standard 
assumptions? On the one hand bimodal bidding densities increase the variance of the bids. On the 
other hand, the fact that bidders appear to gain utility from winning the auction that goes beyond the 
financial benefits reduces their expected monetary payoff.  
Many competitive situations in the real world involve aspects of all-pay auctions, like lobbying 
battles or competing for research money. While our experiment certainly represents a very stylized 
situation we still think it is informative for real life situations. People are aware of the fact that mixed 
strategies are optimal but they seem to be especially attracted to pure strategies at the boundaries of 
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6.  Appendix: Experimental Instructions 
 
 
General explanation for the participants 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment that is financed by different research-promoting facilities. If you are 
reading the following explanation carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – make a considerable amount of 
money. Hence, it is important that you read this explanation carefully.  
The instructions you will receive are for your private information only.  
 
During the experiment absolute silence is required. Communication is prohibited.  
 
If you have any questions please direct them towards us. Non-observance of these rules will lead to exclusion from the 
experiment and any payments. 
During the experiment we do not talk about Swiss Francs. Your income will be calculated in points. At the end of the 
experiment, the attained points will be transferred into Swiss Frances, where  
 
1 point = 1 centime. 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive your earned points (in CHF) plus CHF 20 for showing up, in cash. If you make 
a loss, it will be deducted from the CHF 20. You cannot make an overall loss. 
The next pages describe the detailed procedure of the experiment. 
 
Experiment Instructions: Recall Treatment  
 
You are taking part in an auction. In total there are 10 rounds and in each of these rounds a prize of 100 points is auctioned. 
You will be put in a group of either two or three participants. Hence there will be one other or two other bidders in your 
group besides yourself. The group composition will be constant during the 10 rounds, i.e. in each round you are in the 
same group with either one or two other participants. You will not know who else in this room is in your group; your identity 
will be kept secret. When the auction begins you will have to place your bid. All participants do so at the same time. You can 
place  a  bid  up  to  three  decimal  places.  In  each  group  the  participant  placing  the  highest  bid  wins.  If  more  than  one 
participant bid the same highest value, the computer randomly assigns the winner. Different to usual auctions you might 
know, not only the winner but all bidders have to pay their bid. As soon as the experiment starts you will see the following 
screen:   19 
 
 
On the screen, you can see whether you are placed in a group with 2 or 3 participants. In the right hand upper corner you can 
note the remaining time you have to place your bid. Type your bid into the field. After submitting the bid [pressing OK] you 
will not be able to change it again. You only bid once in each round. You can place bids from and with zero and up to three 
decimal places. 
As soon as all the participants have submitted their bids, the computer will calculate the highest bid and determine the 




You will be notified if you won the auction and of your revenue in this round. Additionally you will see the bids of the other 
participant(s) as well as your own. Subsequently press the ‘continue’ button to proceed to the next round.  
   20 
An example to clarify the rules: 
Assuming that in a group of three participants the following bids are submitted:  
Anton: 10 points 
Berta: 50 points 
Claus: 80 points 
 
Claus wins the auction and has a revenue of 20 points (=100-80) in this round. Anton and Berta do not win, but have to pay 
their bid nevertheless. The revenue of Anton is therefore -10 and that of Berta is -50 in this round.  
 




Experiment Instructions: NoRecall Treatment 
Explanation to the second experiment 
 
The second experiment also consists of 10 rounds, in each of which 100 points are to be auctioned. There are two important 
modifications: 
•  You will not receive any information whether or not you won the auction in this round. You will also not receive 
any information about the bids of the other participants.  
•  The constellation of the group changes in each round. The group size varies between 2 and 3. The computer will 
randomly assign you in a group of 2 or of 3. You will be able to see the size on the screen.  
 
Do you have any questions?  
 